

## ANANKE IN HERODOTUS

**Abstract:** This paper examines Herodotus' use of words of the *ἀνάγκη* family in order to determine which external or internal constraints the historian represents as affecting the causality of events. M. Ostwald's *Ἀνάγκη in Thucydides* (1988) provides a foundation for examining the more restricted application of these terms in Herodotus (85 occurrences vs. 161 in Thucydides). In Herodotus, divine necessity (absent in Thucydides) refers to the predictable results of human wrongdoings more often than to a force constraining human choices. This represents an especially ambiguous Herodotean category, however, and is expressed by a wider range of terms than those with *ἀνάγκη*-stems. The analysis of natural *ἀνάγκη* yields more clear-cut results. (1) In Herodotus (and not in Thucydides) *ἀνάγκη* often qualifies an aggressive compulsion applied by a personal agent. (2) Victims of this despotic *ἀνάγκη* are partially excused, but those who resist it earn Herodotus' praise. (3) Most importantly, Herodotus (unlike Thucydides) never in turn applies *ἀνάγκη* words to circumstances that motivate imperialistic actions, especially starting a war. (4) Whereas in Thucydides agents are 'compelled' to act also by fear and other internal impulses, the only psychological factor to which Herodotus applies *ἀνάγκη* words (and this time mostly in a positive sense) is moral obligation.

Herodotus' concept of *ἀνάγκη* is moralistic, and consistent with his unwillingness to justify imperialism, his practice of assigning responsibility, and his high regard for *nomos*, on the one hand, and freedom on the other. The narrator's involvement in these principles is reflected in Herodotus' use of *ἀνάγκη* terms in self-referential statements of the type 'I am compelled/not compelled to say *x*.' These statements represent the narrator as the opposite of an imperial subject and analogous to the most admirable of his characters on the receiving end of compulsion. He is a free agent, who disregards political pressure and is exclusively compelled by the rules that apply to him as researcher and truthful recorder.

THE uses of words of the *ἀνάγκη* family in the Greek historians illuminate issues of human responsibility and the causality of events. Martin Ostwald's analysis of *ἀνάγκη* in Thucydides provides a wealth of comparative material for examining the concept in Herodotus.<sup>1</sup> The testimony of Thucydides is important for the purpose of discussing Herodotus because both Thucydides himself and the speakers to whom he attributes the standard (i.e. 'necessary') arguments give us the panorama of a whole contemporary political culture that tended to discuss policies and events in terms of what 'necessarily' produced them:<sup>2</sup> factor A does not just lead to event B, but rather forces B. Herodotus, it turns out, is much more discriminating in adding *ἀνάγκη* to his explanations of causes.<sup>3</sup> I hope to show that the way in which Herodotus deals with the notion of necessity constitutes a response to the political discourse current in his and Thucydides' time. More specifically, Herodotus' avoidance of *ἀναγκ-* is consistent with his intention to hold individuals and states responsible (or, as he would say, *aitioi*) for their actions.

In focusing my study on Herodotus' use of *ἀνάγκη* terms, I am aware of two concomitant methodological problems. The first is that such terms have a broad semantic field, depending on the factor that constitutes an *ἀνάγκη*, the specific event it forcibly causes, the parties which it affects and the circumstances under which it does so. We variously translate these terms with words related to compulsion, necessity, inevitability, requirement, or obligation.<sup>4</sup> Keyne Cheshire has recently detected a semantic difference between the nouns *ἀνάγκη* and *ἀναγκαίη* in Homer and Herodotus, arguing that '*ἀνάγκη* refers to more general or abstracted compulsion

<sup>1</sup> Ostwald (1988). I thank Martin Ostwald, Donald Lateiner, Keyne Cheshire and the anonymous referees for *JHS* for reading previous versions of this paper and offering numerous suggestions, all extremely helpful. The responsibility for all remaining errors is of course mine.

<sup>2</sup> Whatever one thinks about the historicity of Thucydides' speeches (see Hornblower (1987) 45-72), *ta deonta* (1.22.1) guarantees at any rate the historicity of the political code – types of arguments, word combinations, etc.

<sup>3</sup> There are 161 occurrences of *ἀναγκ-* in Thucydides, according to Ostwald (1988) 24. My figure of 85

occurrences in Herodotus is based on Powell (1938) s.vv. I count 795 pages of (Oxford) text for Herodotus as opposed to 596 for Thucydides.

<sup>4</sup> '*Ἀνάγκη* terms' include the nouns *ἀνάγκη* and *ἀναγκαίη*, the adjective *ἀναγκαῖος*, the adverb *ἀναγκαιῶς*, and the verbs *ἀναγκάζω*, *ἐπιαναγκάζω* and *ἐξαναγκάζω*. See Lachenaud (1979) 95-6. The compound *προσαναγκάζω*, used by Thucydides, is absent from Herodotus. The noun *ἀναγκαίη* occurs in Herodotus but not in Thucydides (see below and next note).

while ἀνάγκαιη denotes particular instances of it'.<sup>5</sup> All these meanings, however, refer to a situation in which something takes away or severely limits one's choice with respect to a course of action or state of affairs, overriding other considerations that would have made that choice desirable.

Secondly, although ἀνάγκη- terms are particularly strong, they are not the only signals of a situation of constraint. We will need therefore to monitor the uses of expressions with χρή, δεῖ, μέλλω, and so on, as well as being alert to any cases when necessity is emphasized by the way circumstances are described, rather than named with a particular term.

There are two important uses of ἀνάγκη terms that we never find in Thucydides. One of these is attested in Herodotus, the other probably so. The first is the occurrence of these words in self-referential metanarrative, when the narrator (i.e. Herodotus) occasionally introduces or dismisses a topic by saying that he is compelled or not compelled to include certain information in his account. This use of the stem ἀνάγκη- is fundamental to the way in which Herodotus represents his position *vis-à-vis* his audience in comparison with the position in which the characters of his history find themselves in particular cases. It occurs, however, at a different level of discourse from all the other uses. We will therefore discuss it last, after exploring the evidence in the narrative.

The second type of ἀνάγκη that we do not find in Thucydides is that which derives from a higher agency, be it cosmic or divine.<sup>6</sup> In Herodotus' work, which accumulates evidence of divine intervention in human affairs, we would also expect that ἀνάγκη terms would occasionally express the idea that certain actions and events are ultimately made inevitable by the gods. Since what constitutes divine predetermination is one of the most ambivalent areas of Herodotean thought, we will start by considering this transcendent ἀνάγκη. We will then proceed to examine other agents or causes of compulsion, also focusing on the means through which it becomes operative, the results it produces, and the status of those on the receiving end.

### Transcendent necessity

In this section we want to determine whether ἀνάγκη words in the *Histories* ever denote a necessity imposed by the divine; if so, what sort of necessities does the divine impose, whether it forces human actions or their results, and according to what criteria. Though no statement in the *Histories* explicitly attributes ἀνάγκη to the divine, four passages refer to a compulsion that is less clearly due only to natural causes: the first is a narrative of events earlier predicted by an oracle and the remaining three are oracular utterances. Before examining these cases, we should remember that generally in Herodotus the divine intervenes in human affairs either by helping to cause certain effects or by communicating – through oracles, dreams and other signs – that certain effects will take place. The two modes of intervention, however, are largely autonomous: a divine prophecy that something will happen or even that *it is bound* to happen indicates unerring divine foreknowledge of the event, but not necessarily that the divine will be its cause.<sup>7</sup>

A band of armoured Ionian and Carian sea-raiders are sailing in search of plunder when 'necessity constrains them' to land in Egypt, where they eventually help Psammetichus to regain the throne (2.152.4-5). This concrete necessity (ἀνάγκαιη, rather than ἀνάγκη) has presumably natural causes.<sup>8</sup> But the forced arrival of these foreigners fulfils a previous oracle that the exiled Psammetichus would obtain revenge upon his royal colleagues 'through bronze men appearing

<sup>5</sup> I am grateful to K. Cheshire for making available to me a copy of his paper 'The semantic differences of ἀνάγκη and ἀνάγκαιη in Homer and Herodotus', delivered at the 1998 APA meeting in Chicago, as well as a manuscript copy of his article with the same title.

<sup>6</sup> Ostwald (1988) 19, 33.

<sup>7</sup> For this distinction, see Munson (2001). On the truthfulness of oracles, see narrator's generalization at

8.77. The problem of divine necessity is part of the broader issues of the 'fatalistic' strain in Herodotus and his use of oracles, on which more work needs to be done. See Kirchberg (1965), Fornara (1990) and now Harrison (2000) 122-57.

<sup>8</sup> See above, n.5. At 2.152.4 ἀπενειχθῆναι suggests that the ships were forced to put to land by bad weather (cf. 2.114.2).

from the sea' (2.152.3). If there is a higher level of causality for the event, the purpose of the divine constraint must be the fulfilment of a plan in the terms formulated by the oracle: the gods wanted Psammetichus to get his revenge (τίσις).<sup>9</sup>

In three prophetic utterances that express themselves in terms of an ἀνάγκη that something happen, the necessity could itself be divine.<sup>10</sup> At 7.140.2-3\* the Pythia describes to the Athenians blood dripping from the roofbeams of Greek temples in anticipation of the 'constraints of evil' (κακότητος ἀνάγκαι) entailed by Xerxes' invasion. Here κακότης may be active (malice) or passive (misfortune); if passive, the misfortune may belong to the Greeks or to the Persians. The genitive may be subjective (malice or misfortune causing constraints) or objective (someone or something forcibly causing malice or misfortune).<sup>11</sup> The ambiguities are important because they raise the problem of the extent to which the *Histories* represent the Persian invasion of Greece and other acts of aggression as free human choices.

(1) If the phrase κακότητος ἀνάγκαι means 'inevitable malice', then the initiative of Xerxes' invasion would constitute a necessity, and this necessity may originate from the divine (i.e. the gods have forced him to make the expedition). The plural ἀνάγκαι, however, seems rather to refer to the concrete results of the compulsion.<sup>12</sup> The other possible interpretations, therefore, are all more satisfactory than this one. Two of them point to a human agent as cause. (2) The 'inevitable malice' are caused to either party by the malice of Xerxes, and (3) the 'constraints of misfortunes' which weigh upon everyone and especially the Greeks (who are, after all, the recipients of the oracle) are produced by Xerxes.

The divine is only relevant again if the oracle is also predicting that Xerxes the individual will be on the receiving end of divine ἀνάγκαι. (4) The transcendent 'inevitable misfortune' would be Xerxes' defeat, an ethically predictable consequence of his immoral action<sup>13</sup>. The necessity is that of retribution, somewhat as in the case of Psammetichus considered earlier. (5) Similarly, the 'necessities deriving from (Xerxes') malice' are imposed by the gods according to a causal or conditional pattern: if/when/since *x* happens, *y* will necessarily happen. This resembles the explicit conditional formulation of another prophetic utterance with ἀναγκ- (4.179.3): when a descendant of the *Argo's* company carries off Jason's tripod from Triton's temple, it is inevitably decreed that one hundred Greek cities be built on the shores of Lake Triton. Here the ethical motivations of the necessity are less clear than in Xerxes' case.<sup>14</sup> But, at any rate, the oracle predicts the necessity not in an absolute sense, but as something that is either concomitant with or results from a (presumably not inevitable) human action.

The last prophecy with ἀναγκ- concerns once again the Persian invasion of Greece. This time a human speaker, an anonymous Persian, communicates his premonitions to a Greek symposiast: 'Stranger, what must (δεῖ) happen from god is impossible for man to avoid, for no one wants to listen to those who say reliable things. Though a few of us Persians are aware of these things, we still follow, constrained by necessity (ἀναγκαίη ἐνδεδεμένοι). This is the worst sor-

<sup>9</sup> Possibly divine storms occur at 7.188-91 and 8.12-13. Necessity of divine retribution constitutes one of the few principles which the narrator of the *Histories* expresses by a generalized statement in his own voice (2.120.5). Harrison (2000) 102-21.

<sup>10</sup> 4.179.3, 7.140.2-3\*, 9.16.4-5\*. In an additional occurrence of ἀνάγκη in an oracle (1.67.4\*), the necessity is due to mechanical human agency. I follow Powell (1938) in marking '\*' passages in direct speech.

<sup>11</sup> Grene's translation (1987) maintains these ambiguities: 'an evil sheerly constraining'. But see de Sélincourt, revised by Marincola (1996): 'woe that needs must come'; see Waterfield's translation (Dewald (1998)): 'straits of woe'.

<sup>12</sup> Cheshire (1998) argues that ἀναγκαίη in the singular always refers to a specific compulsion; 'but in order to particularize ἀνάγκη so that it refers to the application of compulsion, Herodotus pluralises the word'.

<sup>13</sup> The point is formulated by Themistocles at 8.109.3\*. For the similarities of the Greek concept of morality to our own, see Williams (1993) 1-20. I use the word 'immoral' to denote all actions that in the ethical code of the *Histories* are, or would be, called ἄδικα (cf. 1.5.3).

<sup>14</sup> On the uncertain meaning of Triton's alleged prophecy, see Corcella (1993) 367.

row for men, to know much and have no power' (9.16.5\*). What 'must happen from god' is the Persian defeat at Plataea. The event is god-willed and inevitable not in an absolute way, but simply because (γάρ) those in power do not listen to the wise who would prevent the immoral behaviour upon which divine retribution will necessarily follow.<sup>15</sup> The ἀναγκαίη by which the few wise but powerless Persians are constrained is in a sense identical with this transcendent necessity: they, too, with the rest of the army, will be unable to escape the god-willed disaster (see 9.16.3\*). At a more immediate level of meaning, however, ἀναγκαίη is also the compulsion applied by the despotic ruler who forces people to go along with his self-destructive enterprise. Just as in the Delphic oracle we have already discussed, Xerxes' aggression causes inevitable misfortune (interpretation 3), so here Xerxes' Persian subjects are compelled to a service which will in turn cause their misfortune.

Thus, in all four passages where an ἀνάγκη word *may* imply the idea of divine predisposition, the necessity is more likely to be the result than a mysterious cause of a human action. Three times out of four the god-willed result is ethically rational in the sense that it represents τίσις. The two cases involving Xerxes, however, also encapsulate a different, non-transcendent meaning of ἀνάγκη which, as we shall see in a later section, is most prominent in the *Histories* as a whole – the compulsion exercised on others by a monarchical ruler.

### Transcendent pre-determination with χρή/δεῖ and μέλλω

Since in the passage we have just discussed a speaker maintains that certain things 'must (δεῖ) happen *from god*', we must consider whether there are other passages in the *Histories* which possibly allude to divine necessity with δεῖ or other expressions.<sup>16</sup> In such cases we wish to verify, once again, the extent to which divine necessity constrains human choices or whether it responds and adapts to these choices. Close to the utterance of the anonymous Persian at 9.16.5\*, for example, is the reported *gnome* of Amasis who, upon hearing that Polycrates had found the ring he had deliberately thrown into the sea, 'understood that it was impossible for a man to rescue another man *from what was going to happen* (ἐκ τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεσθαι πρήγματος) and that Polycrates *was not going to end up well* (οὐκ εὖ τελευτήσειν μέλλοι), being so lucky in everything that he even found what he threw away' (3.43.1). Amasis is apparently referring to a superior force that rules the destiny of men. He conceives of this force in amoral terms, as something that strikes men down not because they act unjustly, but because they are excessively fortunate. A similar conception emerges from Solon's notion of divine envy and, *mutatis mutandis*, from Artabanus' statement that the divine maintains a cosmic balance by striking down what is too big.<sup>17</sup>

Some statements that a specific historical event *must* happen (with χρή/χρεόν and δεῖ) come from divine prophecies. These are all but one in *oratio obliqua*<sup>18</sup> and represent a weaker version of those oracles we have already seen that use an ἀνάγκη term to predict a necessity that may or may not be itself divine.<sup>19</sup> Interesting for our purposes, therefore, are only those oracles that say that something bad is or was bound to happen, implying that the human behaviour that caused it occurred precisely for the sake of producing that result, so that this behaviour itself appears to be inevitable.

<sup>15</sup> *Sophie* overlaps with moral righteousness in the case of 'wise advisers'. See Lattimore (1939); Dewald (1985).

<sup>16</sup> See Hohti (1975).

<sup>17</sup> 1.32.1\* (Solon); 7.10.ε\*, cf. 7.46.3\* (Artabanus). The narrator does not necessarily support these exact views, but my concern here is to examine all the different evidence Herodotus presents, including the opinions of his characters.

<sup>18</sup> Hohti (1975) 32, who does not mention the exception at 7.17.2\*.

<sup>19</sup> 1.120.1: χρήν that Cyrus become king. 2.55.2:

χρεόν that an oracle of Zeus rise in Dodona. 7.6.4: χρεόν that Xerxes invade Greece. 8.53.1: ἔδει that Attica fall to the Persians. 7.141.1: χρήσασθαι that the Acropolis survive and 7.142.3: δεῖ that the Athenians be defeated in a naval battle (misinterpretations). 8.141.1: χρεόν that the Spartans and the other Dorians be expelled from the Peloponnese by Medes and Athenians (unfulfilled). 8.62.2\*: δεῖν that the Athenians colonize Siris (fulfilled in the extra-textual future). See also 9.42.3\*, cited below, n.24. For μέλλω in prophecies in indirect speech, see 1.45.2\*, 1.108.2, etc.

After Marathon, Miltiades makes an expedition against Paros which the text represents as unjustified (6.133.1). In the course of this expedition he desecrates the local temple of Demeter with the collaboration of one of the priestesses; the outcome is that Miltiades gets wounded, fails in the expedition and ends up entangled in legal and political trouble until he dies of gangrene. The Delphic oracle forbids the Parians to discipline the corrupt priestess on the grounds that she was not responsible for these things and she simply appeared to Miltiades as a guide of wrongdoings/misfortunes (κακά). For, the oracle says, *he was bound* to end up badly: δειν γὰρ Μιλτιάδεα τελευτᾶν μὴ εὖ (6.135.3). Here the necessity is clearly transcendent, but the priestess' wrongdoing is not a divine entrapment which pushes an innocent man to commit a crime. It rather serves to direct his criminal behaviour (represented by his aggression against Paros) to the sphere of religion and cult, and this triggers his doom.

The general pattern established by the oracular interpretation of Miltiades' career (wrongdoing, inevitability of punishment, final trigger for the punishment), is elsewhere confirmed by the narrator's 'anticipations of doom', which retrospectively interpret an action as occurring because the agent *'was bound* to end up badly'. Thus, Apries was one of the luckiest Egyptian kings, who invaded Sidon and fought against Tyre;<sup>20</sup> then, 'since things were bound to turn out badly for him' (ἐπεῖτε ἔδεε οἱ κακῶς γενέσθαι), the trigger (πρόφασις) is his unsuccessful expedition against Cyrene as a result of which he lost his throne (2.161.3).<sup>21</sup> Similarly, Scyles leads an abnormal double-life for a Scythian king before he decides to become initiated in the rites of Dionysus, which the Scythians abhor. This culminating action must have been due to the fact that 'things were bound to turn out badly for him', interprets the narrator, and is indeed the πρόφασις for his doing so (4.79.1). Both for Apries and Scyles the bad end and the self-detrimental behaviour that immediately causes it may be pre-determined by a higher external force.<sup>22</sup> Such necessities, however, represent a predictable response to previous, not inevitable, human choices.<sup>23</sup>

In another famous case, that of Candaules, the initial ethical reason for the agent's downfall emerges from the insistence in the narrative on his abnormal state of mind ('This Candaules was *seized by love* for his wife, and *being in love* with her...'). The single action that led to his death, his request that his servant Gyges contrive to see his wife naked, is then explained as due to the necessity that Candaules end up badly (1.8.1-2). It is perhaps significant that the gloss here uses not δειν, as in the instances we have seen so far, but χρή. This points to a more internal necessity, the individual predisposition of Candaules, his ethos synonymous with 'fate'.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> In Herodotus great good fortune carries connotations of imminent unethical behaviour, due to overconfidence or other psychological impulses (see e.g. the interpretive gloss at 1.36.1). Hence, it is a sign of impending doom: Lateiner (1982).

<sup>21</sup> On *prophasis* in Herodotus and other texts, see Pearson (1952) and Rawlings (1975). There is no reason to devalue this type of interpretive gloss in Herodotus, *pace* Gould (1989) 73-90, esp. 77.

<sup>22</sup> The divine element is emphasized in the narrative of Scyles, where a god hurls a thunderbolt that destroys his luxurious 'Greek' town-house just before his initiation. The interpretation of a *natural* (obligatory) causality, on the other hand, is suggested to the narrator by the earlier experience of Anacharsis recounted just above (4.76), as Hohti (1975) 34 correctly saw. In the case of Apries, the narrator's anticipation of doom with δειν at 2.161.3 dovetails with the oracle reported in the fuller version of the story at 5.159.

<sup>23</sup> See also the gloss of anticipation of doom concerning Artaynte at 9.109.2 (though with no sign that the necessity is divine in this case). For μοῖρα as the inevitable consequence of someone's action, see 1.91.1\*-2\*, 4.164.4 and, arguably, 1.121\* and 3.142.3\*, though not μόρσιμον at 3.154.1. Less remarkable for what the text communicates about the way in which divine necessity works are those cases where the narrator or a speaker interprets a set of circumstances (rather than a human action) as meaning that something that happened was in fact bound to happen. See 5.33.2 (the only gloss with δειν in the negative: the emphasis is here on '*this* expedition', with allusion to a later occasion outside of the chronological range of the *Histories*) and 5.92d1\* (the only gloss of this sort in an intradiegetic narrative). The gloss at 6.64 points to the inevitability of logical consequences rather than divine necessity.

<sup>24</sup> See Benardete (1965), especially 285 and 290-5. I owe this reference as well as an enhanced understanding

Predisposition may also play a role in the prophecy in direct speech at 7.17.2\*. Here a dream which has already warned Xerxes about ‘what he must suffer’ (τὰ δεῖ παθεῖν) if he cancels his plan to march against Greece, also threatens Artabanus with punishment if he attempts to prevent ‘what is supposed to happen’ (τὸ χρεὸν γενέσθαι). Τὸ χρεὸν γενέσθαι is the expedition itself; τὰ δεῖ παθεῖν is the fact of Xerxes’ becoming smaller if he does not undertake it (see 7.14\*). Both expressions indicate some sort of necessity, but while δεῖ refers only to the imposition of an *outcome* as if from the outside, χρεὸν may rather allude to a behaviour that is made ‘obligatory’ by immanent causes, being the sort of action that this Persian king and his adviser, with their particular social, historical or personal backgrounds, are expected to do.

The expression τὸ χρεὸν γενέσθαι of the dream also resembles those paraphrases of oracular prescriptions (as opposed to predictions) that people do such and such a thing so as to bring about certain results. In two cases of this type the result is undesirable and fixed, but the agent declines to cooperate as he ‘should’ in bringing it about with his own wrong-doings.<sup>25</sup> Egypt must suffer one hundred and fifty years of misery (2.133.3: external necessity, possibly divine, with δεῖ), but Mycerinus has not done what he was ‘bound’ or expected to do (τὸ χρεὸν ποιεῖν) for this plan entirely to succeed. Similarly, Ethiopian rule in Egypt must only last fifty years (2.139.3, δέοι), but the Ethiopian king rejects the vision’s command to do something unholy to bring it to an end. Divine prescriptions as such, in other words, do not eliminate the agent’s freedom to decide as he wishes. To be sure, for Mycerinus and the Ethiopian king the trade-off is respectively death and renouncing power. In the case of Xerxes, moreover, the vision promises him a rapid decline into insignificance if he does not march against Greece, without at the same time making him aware that the expedition will fail. The dream forces his decision, and dreams in Herodotus are generally divine.<sup>26</sup> The reasons *why* god would force an action which is both immoral and unwise, and why he would do so precisely in order to produce the agent’s failure may have to do with the punishment of evil intentions, as in the case of Glaucus (6.86α-δ), or with the cosmic balance or divine envy to which, as we have mentioned, various characters refer; or, given the variable timing of divine retribution, they may derive from the guilt of Xerxes’ predecessors, in the same way as the μῶϊρα of Croesus was at one level caused by the guilt of Gyges (1.91.1\*). These reasons are, at any rate, less clearly formulated and less ethically predictable – and therefore the outcomes are less avoidable – than in those cases when an agent’s failure appears to be the necessary punishment of his own wrongdoing.

In this and in the preceding section we have seen that when the narrator, a character, an oracle, or a dream says, or possibly means to say, that something is bound to happen *because* god will make it happen, this divine necessity tends to concern the ethically rational result of a non-necessary and culpable human action rather than inexplicably causing men to behave in a certain way. We should not, of course, minimize the importance of cases that we have found to be ambiguous. They are, after all, representative of the overall uncertainty that emerges from the speculations of different characters about the intentions and actions of the gods and from the special caution the narrator himself exercises in this sphere.<sup>27</sup> But in proportion to the sustained interest the *Histories* demonstrate in the work of the divine, the instances where they represent it as constraining human choice are infrequent. This is in itself remarkable, and consistent with the complex, but more clearly defin-

of the case of Candaules to discussions with M. Ostwald. See also Williams (1993) 136 for ethos as fate in relation to divine necessity in Greek tragedy. At 9.42.3\*, Mardonius paraphrases an oracle predicting that an invading army is bound to plunder the temple of Delphi (χρεὸν), and will all perish after the deed. Here ‘is bound’ perhaps means not so much that it will or that it is ‘fated’ to do so, but that this is the way an invading army (be it Persian or Illyrian: see 9.43.2) is inclined to behave.

<sup>25</sup> Contrast 5.89.3 (*cf.* 5.89.2), where the Athenians decline to do what an oracle says they ‘should’ (χρεὸν), thereby forgoing desirable results. For similar paraphrases of oracles with χρεὸν/δεῖ see e.g. 5.79.2\* (δεῖ), and *cf.* 1.39.2\* (χρηῖν), the last an incorrect interpretation.

<sup>26</sup> See Frisch (1968). For the divine origin of this particular dream, see Solmsen (1974) 148-57. Its naturalistic aspect will become relevant below, p. 43.

<sup>27</sup> See especially 9.65.2, 2.3.2, 7.129.4.

able role Herodotus attributes to natural necessity of different types. The latter represents the most important focus of our discussion. We shall now turn to it, concentrating on the use of words in the ἀνάγκη family, though we will monitor the uses of other terms, for the most part in the footnotes.

### Human agents of compulsion

In Herodotus the most pervasive overarching cause of compulsion, which appears in over half the total number of occurrences of ἀνάγκη terms, is represented by specific human agents.<sup>28</sup> These are, in most cases, individuals who rely on their political or military power, especially kings, tyrants and their representatives or other despotic types.<sup>29</sup> Gyges is compelled by the queen to choose between killing Candaules or dying himself;<sup>30</sup> the cowherd is compelled by Astyages' minister to expose the infant Cyrus (1.112.2\*); Prexaspes is compelled by Cambyses to kill Smerdis (3.75.2). Deioces compels the Medes to build Ecbatana (1.98.3), and conquered men are compelled by Sesostrius to dig canals (2.108.2). Darius compels Sataspes to circumnavigate Libya (4.43.3).

Cyrus' general Mazares compels the Lydians to change their material culture (1.157.2), and Amyntas is compelled by Darius' ambassadors to have his women-folk sit with the male guests at a banquet (5.18.5). Other violations of *nomos* occur when Artabanus is compelled by Xerxes to masquerade as king and sit on his throne for the purpose of testing the dream (7.16.1, reinforced by δεῖ at 7.16γ3\*), and when Xerxes' guards try to force the Spartan heralds Sperthias and Boulis to comply with *Persian* custom and prostrate themselves in the presence of the king (7.136.1).

Astyages compels the herdsman Mitradates to tell the truth about Cyrus (1.116.4 and 5); Croesus is compelled to answer Cyrus' questions (1.86.4) and Demaratus is compelled by the king to give his opinion (7.104.1\*, 5\*).

The Thracians, Thessalians and other Greeks surrender to Xerxes under compulsion and many, including the Ionians, are compelled to participate in his expedition (7.108.1, 110, 132.2, 172.1, 8.22.2\*, 9.17.1); the Peloponnesians risked a similar fate (7.139.3). The king's armies go to war compelled by the whip (7.103.4\*).<sup>31</sup> Aeginetan ships are seized under compulsion by the Spartan king Cleomenes for the purposes of his expedition against Argos (6.92.1). The Greek tyrant Micythus compels Rhegium to support Tarentum against Iapygians and Messapians, thereby losing 3000 men in the worst slaughter of Greeks that ever occurred (7.170.3).

In all these cases compulsion is intentional and accomplished by force. In Thucydides someone may compel another to do something simply by going about his own business, or one may manipulate ἀνάγκη by strategy. But in Herodotus personal compulsion tends to be both targeted and brutal.<sup>32</sup> In the passage where Mitradates is forced to reveal what he knows about the

<sup>28</sup> 45 cases. For χρή in reference to obligation imposed by a human agent, see 1.69.1 (Croesus), 1.88.2\* (Cyrus), 1.108.5\* (Astyages), 3.20.1 (Cambyses), 4.9.4 (Heracles), 7.8.δ1\* (Xerxes), 7.52.2\* (Xerxes, but through circumstances and personal interest), 7.160.2\* (Gelon), 8.75.1 (Themistocles), 8.100.5\* (Xerxes). For δεῖ, see 1.11.2\* and 3\* (queen), 1.42.2\* (Croesus, but also moral obligation), 1.109.4\* *bis* (Astyages), 7.8.δ1\*, 7.16.γ3\*, 7.23.3 (Xerxes), 8.6.2 (Persians), 7.51.2\* (Xerxes, for first part of Ionians' choice), 8.80.1\* (Themistocles), 9.33.5 (Tisamenus vs. Spartans).

<sup>29</sup> 35 cases. The instances where this does not properly apply include: Darius (not yet king) compelling the conspirators to kill the false Smerdis immediately (3.72.1\*); the Greeks cannot compel the Thessalians to fight the Persians alone (7.172.3\* twice); the Thebans have come to Thermopylae compelled by the Greeks

(7.233.1); Hermotimus compels Panionios and sons to castrate each other (8.106.4, three times); Thera colonists are compelled to sail back to Libya by their fellow-citizens (4.156.3); princess-turned-prostitute compels her clients to reveal secrets about their lives (2.121ε2); Solon leaves to prevent the Athenians from compelling him to revoke his laws (1.29.1; but see below, p. 45).

<sup>30</sup> 1.11.3, 4. For the proliferation of ἀνάγκη- and δεῖ in this episode, see below n.80.

<sup>31</sup> At 8.130.2 no one compels the Persian/Phoenician fleet to advance west of Samos. This may mean that no orders came from the king, or that the enemy's strategy did not require the Persians to do anything in particular.

<sup>32</sup> See Ostwald (1988) 13 for ἀνάγκη produced by strategy in Thucydides. In Herodotus, with the possible partial exception of the negative statement cited in the

child Cyrus, the plural ἀνάγκαι really means torture (1.116.4 and 5). Sperthias and Boulis must endure their heads being physically pushed to the ground (7.136.1), and in the narrative of the Persian occupation of Caria, ἀνάγκη is contrasted with ‘voluntary’ surrender and must indicate either military occupation or immediate threat of an attack (6.25.2).

As the list given above also shows, the actions a despotic agent compels others to do are almost always undesirable for the compelled party because immoral, culturally inappropriate, self-detrimental, physically arduous, or dangerous.<sup>33</sup> The ἀνάγκη itself tends to have negative moral connotations in both directions. In Thucydides, for example, commanders may face an emergency by compelling their troops to perform unpleasant tasks without these cases signifying the high-handedness of the one or a loss of dignity for the other.<sup>34</sup> In Herodotus, by contrast, ἀνάγκη is used to describe conquest or an overbearing exercise of power.<sup>35</sup> To be subject to ἀνάγκη may represent an extenuating circumstance of bad behaviour,<sup>36</sup> but only up to a point<sup>37</sup>; it is also tantamount to slavery and a reason for contempt (7.110-111.1, 7.99.1, 7.96.1-2). To disregard personal ἀνάγκη is worthy of praise. Artemisia, who acts independently of it, is called a *thoma* (7.99.1). Sperthias and Boulis, who resist heroically, are described in the same terms (7.135-6).

Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides is unimpressed by stubborn resistance to ἀνάγκη even when he uses the word in a way that corresponds somewhat to Herodotus’ ‘monarchical ἀνάγκη’, to refer to a power exercising imperialistic compulsion over a weaker party. Both Athenians and Peloponnesians forcibly exact tribute, military service, war contributions or allegiance from actual or potential subjects and allies.<sup>38</sup> Within city-states in a situation of *stasis*, one faction may impose measures over another by ἀνάγκη.<sup>39</sup> In Herodotus, however, the relentless attribution of ἀνάγκη to despots colours the term with an intense moralism absent from Thucydides and makes one case in which it is imposed by Greeks on other Greeks particularly meaningful.

At 8.111.2 Themistocles, who after Salamis exacts contributions from the islanders, presents himself to the Andrians declaring that the Athenians are assisted by two powerful goddesses, Peitho (Persuasion), and Anankaie.<sup>40</sup> This passage helps to clarify beyond a shadow of a doubt the political meaning of historical kings and tyrants in Herodotus as paradigms for contemporary abuses of power by Greek leaders or leading Greek city-states.<sup>41</sup> The way in which Themistocles objectifies and divinizes the concept of imperialistic compulsion recalls the Athenians in Thucydides, who justify their aggression of the Melians in 416 BC on the basis of a cosmic law perhaps governing gods as well as men (Thuc. 5.105.1-3). Themistocles’ rhetorical pairing of persuasion and ἀναγκαίη is analogous to the combination of Athenian compulsion and ‘persuasion’

note above and the never implemented plan by which the Carians would have compelled themselves to be more courageous by fighting with the river behind them (5.118.2), strategy is never said to *compel* anyone to do something. So for example, the Syracusans *compel* the Athenians to fight in their harbour (Thuc. 7.51.1); but in a somewhat parallel passage in Herodotus, where Themistocles makes the Persians fight in the narrows (Hdt. 8.75-83), no ἀναγκ- stem is to be found (only δεῖ at 8.80.1\*). Aside from this case, no one in Herodotus *must* ever do something with χρῆ and δεῖ because of someone else’s strategy. The exception points to Themistocles’ high-handed methods *vis-à-vis* his fellow-Greeks. See Munson (1988) 98 and 101, and below pp. 37-8.

<sup>33</sup> The only two exceptions occur at 8.140α2\* and 6.42.1-2.

<sup>34</sup> E.g. Thuc. 8.24.2. Ostwald (1988) 11-12.

<sup>35</sup> See 8.130.2 (in a negative statement) for an exception.

<sup>36</sup> Only Greek states who medized ‘without compulsion’ will be held accountable by the other Greeks (7.132.3). The Thebans at Thermopylae claim that, since they have joined the Greeks under compulsion, they are guiltless (ἀναίτιοι) toward the king (7.233.1). See also 8.22.2\* (cf. Thuc. 3.39.2\*).

<sup>37</sup> 1.13.2 and 91.1; 6.92.1.

<sup>38</sup> The compelling agent is Athens at Thuc. 1.99.1 (where Williams (1993) 105 notices the ‘sinister plural’), 3.90.3, 6.88.5, 8.76.4, 5.84.2. On the Peloponnesian side, see Thuc. 1.107.2, 3.61.2\*, 3.39.2\*, 5.31.3, 6.91.4\*, 7.18.4, 8.3.1.

<sup>39</sup> 3.71.1, 4.74.3, 8.38.3, 8.76.6. Ostwald (1988) 12-14.

<sup>40</sup> For the other two cases of ἀνάγκη imposed by Greeks (7.172.3\* and 7.233.1), see n.44.

<sup>41</sup> For the thesis that Herodotus uses the past as a vehicle for speaking about the present, see especially Fornara (1971) 37-93 and (1981), followed by Raaflaub (1987), Stadter (1992), Moles (1996), all ultimately indebted to Strasburger (1955).



of the Melians in Thucydides (see especially 5.84.2 and 5.98).<sup>42</sup> This says nothing about the relative date of composition of the two passages, but certainly reflects contemporary political discourse. Their emphasis is different, however. In Thucydides the Athenian aggression against a little island marks the culmination of the objective constraints upon the weak (and of the psychological pressure upon the powerful) imposed by war. Herodotus, on the other hand, uses his case to show an abrupt and gratuitous reversal from Xerxes to Athens as the agent of compulsion against the Greek states or, in other words, a transition from the literal to a metaphorical meaning of monarchical compulsion.<sup>43</sup>

The responses to Athenian demands by Andrians and Melians respectively also illustrate the two authors' different views of the victims of ἀνάγκη. The Melian argument that the Athenian aggression is immoral and ultimately self-detrimental is in the best archaic tradition and resembles an adjourned theorization of Herodotus' political message throughout his work. But in the context of the history of *Thucydides*, the Melians' choice appears self-destructive and naïve. Herodotus' Andrians, by contrast, provide no lengthy philosophical argument, only a brisk repartee designed to show the practical limits to a superpower's ability to impose ἀνάγκη upon others on its preferred terms. Congratulations to the Athenians for their two powerful goddesses; the Andrians themselves can only count on two useless divinities, Poverty (Πενία) and Helplessness (Ἀμηχανία); and there is no way that the power (δύναμις) of the Athenians could be stronger than their own powerlessness (ἀδυνασία).<sup>44</sup> With this answer they give no money and are put under siege. The result is the same as for the Melians but, albeit without show of heroism, Herodotus' Andrians join the exalted company of Sperthias and Boulis and others who resist or shrug off despotic ἀνάγκη.

### **Non-personal causes of compulsion: factors of the physical world, external circumstances and human emotions**

Because of the prominence of description in his work Herodotus, unlike Thucydides, has the opportunity to mention natural laws and geographical features. He occasionally applies ἀνάγκη words to these phenomena, not because they specifically affect the characters in his historical narrative, but in order to emphasize their predictability and the logical deductions a scientist can draw from them.<sup>45</sup> His appeals to a physical necessity finds close parallels in the discourse of the Hippocratic medical writers.<sup>46</sup>

Herodotus' interest in boundaries, including metaphorical ones, may account for those cases where he refers to the potential ἀνάγκη, should one wish to go from point A to point B, of cross-

<sup>42</sup> The parallelism has long since been noticed. See Immerwahr (1966) 200 and his n.29.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. the allusion to a reversal from Persian to Athenian domination in Herodotus at 7.110, where the Thracians are *compelled* by Xerxes, all except the Satrai, who 'continue to be free still in my time, alone among the Thracians'. At the time of narration the Thracians, except for the Satrai, are subject to Athens just as they were then compelled by Xerxes. Compare the possible implicit parallel between Persian and Athenian tribute at 6.42.2, though the meaning of this passage is controversial: see Stadter (1992) 797-8 and n.41.

<sup>44</sup> 8.111.2-3. At 7.172.2-3\*, a similar response is provided under very different circumstances by the Thessalians to the confederate Greeks: 'If you do not want to come to our aid, you are in no position to apply ἀναγκαίη on us [and make us resist the Persians by ourselves]; for never has ἀνάγκη been stronger than powerlessness (ἀδυνασία)'. Here the ἀναγκαίη applied by the Greeks on the Thessalians may be that of moral obliga-

tion (see below, p.44 and n.76); it is at any rate bound to be weaker than their powerlessness *vis-à-vis* the compulsion applied by Xerxes (cf. 7.172.1). The irony of competing constraints also occurs at 7.233.1-2, where the Thebans, who have been fighting against the Persians at Thermopylae ὑπ' ἀναγκαίης (i.e. compelled by the Greeks, presumably by force), surrender to the king and are immediately branded as (his) slaves.

<sup>45</sup> Herodotus appeals to scientific ἀνάγκη in his discussion of the flood of the Nile (2.22.3; cf. 2.22.4). See also the contrary to fact conditions at 2.20.3 (scientific necessity with χρῆν based on logical reasoning) and 2.15.2 (purely logical necessity with ἔδει).

<sup>46</sup> See Lloyd (1987) 119-23 on 'dogmatic *ananke*' in the Hippocratics, especially in the first four chapters of *Diseases I*. On the Hippocratics and Herodotus, see Lateiner (1986); Thomas (1997) and (2000) 168-212 and 221; C. Pelling, 'Causes, scientific and other: Hippocratics and historians' (forthcoming).

ing rivers and other obstacles: everyone, not only conquerers but also road-builders and innocent tourists, must come to terms with the natural lay of the land.<sup>47</sup> Two or three times in the historical narrative natural forces and geography constrain specific human actions or can be strategically manipulated to bring about certain behaviour.<sup>48</sup> On the whole, however, the physical world, in spite of the importance which Herodotus attributes to it, does not in itself yield an extensive category of what Herodotus explicitly labels as ἀνάγκαι: something that is beyond men's control and that causes them to suffer or do things independently of their will.

Among the most frequent non-personal causes of compulsion in Thucydides are circumstances arising from strategies, policies or inter-city relations. Overcrowding in the city during the war, for example, forced the Athenians to occupy the Pelargikon (Thuc. 2.17.1). The Mytileneans had been planning to secede from the Athenian League (this is a free choice), but leaks concerning their plot compelled them to act sooner than they had intended (Thuc. 3.2.1-4). Frequently it is not only one thing that creates ἀνάγκη, but a complex of different factors or a concatenation of events some of which, though not all, were in turn inevitable and together end up creating an impasse at a certain point.<sup>49</sup> Thus, the deteriorating relations between Corcyra and Corinth over Epidamnus *compelled* the Corcyreans to seek the alliance of Athens; subsequently Athenian ships supporting the Corcyreans at Sybota became *perforce* embroiled with the Corinthians.<sup>50</sup> This example illustrates how Thucydides' notion of ἀνάγκη extends beyond the situation of someone who is left with no choice.<sup>51</sup> A complication that further broadens Thucydides' application of ἀνάγκη terms is that external factors tend to be presented as compelling because they are so perceived by those who experience them.<sup>52</sup>

The issue of perception leads us to the important Thucydidean category of internal compelling causes. These are essential needs (e.g. hunger), mental states, and set responses (fear, ambition, wrath, etc.) which result in psychological compulsion. The compulsion is here 'subjective' to the extent that people find themselves in different positions at a given time, even though their impulses are predictable for everyone in the same circumstances because they are universally inherent in human nature. The pervasiveness and interrelation of these overlapping categories – external and internal non-manipulated ἀνάγκαι – are fundamental for our understanding of Thucydides' view of historical causality and, in particular, his statement about the inevitability of the Peloponnesian war:

The truest cause, though the one least openly discussed, I believe was the fact that the *Athenian power* which was *growing* and which *inspired fear in the Lacedaemonians* made the war inevitable (ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν).<sup>53</sup>

<sup>47</sup> 5.52.2, 5.52.4, 7.31. On geographical and moral boundaries in Herodotus, see especially Lateiner 1989.126-44. Necessity caused (to no one in particular) by some physical obstacle is occasionally expressed by χρή (1.186.1, 8.129.2) or δεῖ (2.29.2 and 3).

<sup>48</sup> See 2.152.4, already discussed (Ionians and Carians compelled to land in Egypt); 5.101.2 (Persians compelled by the fire of Sardis to fight on either side of the river Pactolus). The nature of the land and its fauna dictates the need with δεῖ at 3.110. The manipulation of geographical *ananke* at 5.118.2 overlaps with personal *ananke* through strategy (above, n.32).

<sup>49</sup> Ostwald (1988) 15, 23.

<sup>50</sup> See Thuc.1.28.3\*, 32.5\*, 40.3\*, 49.7, discussed by Ostwald (1988) 26-7.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. de Ste. Croix (1972) 61.

<sup>52</sup> See Ostwald (1988) 24, 33 and esp. 16, where he discusses a typical example: 'Thucydides describes Cleon as compelled by a situation in which, to advocate the blockade of Sphacteria, he would either have to agree with reports he had denounced, or be proved a liar (IV.27.4). No doubt, objectively speaking, other courses of action would have been open to him, but none would have been free from risks made inadvisable for him to take in his public position'.

<sup>53</sup> Thuc. 1.23.6. Ostwald (1988) 1-5. This is also the judgement of Pericles and of the majority opinion in Athens (Thuc. 1.144.3\*). Ostwald (1988) 40-1. Even in the absence of ἀνάγκη terms, the Athenians' decision to accept an alliance with Corcyra (1.44.2) is based on the belief that a war against the Peloponnesians is in any case imminent (1.36\*; cf. 1.42\*). On the other side, the necessity of the Peloponnesian war is affirmed with ἀναγκ- by the Corinthians (1.70.2\* and 1.71.3\*; 1.124.2\*).

The Lacedaemonians' fear of Athens belongs to the order of psychological constraints to which all men would be subject under similar circumstances, just as the growth of Athenian power, at least according to the argument of the Athenians themselves elsewhere reported by Thucydides, has been in turn the result of universal internal motivations of the same type.<sup>54</sup> In these passages, psychological and political factors partake of the causal necessity postulated by the Hippocratics, so that Thucydides' approach to history, at least at this point in his work, is 'scientific' and non-moralistic. Scientific, because in the sphere of human actions and events, as for natural phenomena or diseases, a certain combination of elements necessarily gives rise to determinate results. Non-moralistic, because events, and in particular the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war or any war, are nobody's 'fault'.<sup>55</sup>

States of mind are, on the other hand, entirely absent from the list of Herodotean ἀνάγκαι.<sup>56</sup> Universal features of human behaviour are also rarely identified as necessities.<sup>57</sup> But again, in Herodotus, most impersonal causes and motivations, both internal and external, including physical and strategic, are less insistently emphasized by the use of ἀνάγκη words than in Thucydides.<sup>58</sup> Close to Thucydides' view of the force of complex and often unpredictable circumstances, however, is an interpretive gloss by which Herodotus underlines a change in the balance of power and the growth of states: the war of Athens against Aegina was the salvation of Greece because it forced the Athenians to become a naval power (ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, 7.144.1-2). Similarly, but without the typical Herodotean emphasis on the paradox of the reversal, the Syracusan Hermocrates in Thucydides says that the Athenians have become mariners because compelled by the Persian War (ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν Μήδων, 7.21.3), and the Thucydides-narrator himself echoes and completes this speaker's thought when he states that the Sicilians have acquired their navy because of the necessity of the Athenian invasion (κατ' ἀνάγκην ἤδη τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσγεγεννημένου, 8.2.3).

<sup>54</sup> Thuc. 1.75.3\*. The Athenians add that if the Lacedaemonians had pursued the war against Persia they would have been similarly compelled (ἀναγκασθέντας) either to rule with a strong hand or put themselves in danger (1.76.1\*). For other passages in Thucydides affirming the necessity of imperial expansion and other war initiatives, see 5.105.2\* (Athenians to Melians); 6.87.2\* (the Athenian Euphemus at Camarina).

<sup>55</sup> For ἀνάγκη in the Hippocratics, see above, p.38 and n.46. For the idea of the existence of universal motivating human forces in Thucydides, see e.g. Archidamus' statement at 1.84.4\*. Hornblower (1987) 76-77; Ostwald (1988) 30. On Thucydides' scientific stance, see Connor (1976). Thucydides' 'scientific' view of necessity is partially rooted in an older moralistic tradition; see e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 218 and Williams (1993) 130-67.

<sup>56</sup> If we interpret Candaules' irrational love as the necessary cause of his bizarre behaviour and subsequent bad end, this is a unique application of χρῆ to an emotional factor (above, p. 34). Otherwise, aside from the hypothetical 'must' at 1.129.4, 3.139.3\*, 7.9.β2\* and 3.80.4\*, χρῆ or δεῖ are never used to express what one must absolutely do or obtain by virtue of one's state of mind.

<sup>57</sup> The biological need for people to relieve themselves is called ἀναγκαῖα at 2.35.3. The Persians say that no one ever kills his true father or mother, and in cases where that seems to have occurred an appropriate inquiry would necessarily reveal that the child was either a changeling or a bastard (1.137.2: notice the dogmatic use of *ananke* here, and cf. above p.38 and n.46). They also believe that being in debt inevitably leads people to

lie (1.138.1). A requirement of the human condition is expressed by χρῆ at 7.50.2\*; by δεῖ at 5.4.2; and by ὀφείλω at 7.203.2. At 7.125 the ἀνάγκη which determines a strange behaviour of lions appears more mysterious than biological or circumstantial (cf. 7.225.2 and see Immerwahr (1966) 260 with his n.69).

<sup>58</sup> For external physical ἀνάγκη, see above pp.38-9. For external circumstances, see 7.229.2 (the behaviour of Eurytus makes the Spartan anger against Aristodemus inevitable); 6.95.2 (the fact that Naxos has not been captured forces Datis and Artaphernes to cross straight through the Aegean); 8.109.2\* (Themistocles generalizes that people who are 'driven to necessity' will recoup). For *ananke* produced by an opponent's strategy (obviously overlapping with personal *ananke*), see above, n.32. For strategy compelling one's own military actions, see 9.15.2 (Mardonius cuts Theban trees because he is compelled to build a palisade); χρῆ and δεῖ are more frequently used of military or political requirements, though in the absence of an explicit cause, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between these and moral obligation, e.g. at 9.16.4\* (below, p.45). For χρῆ, see also 1.123.2, 4.118.4\* (hypothetical), 5.49.8\*, 5.50.2, 6.23.2, 6.43.3, 6.84.2, 7.9β2\*, 7.52.2\*, 7.172.2\*, 8.3.1, 8.74.2, 9.25.2, 9.26.3\*, 9.41.2, 9.46.2\* and 3\*, 9.53.4 and 9.98.3\* (both overlap with moral obligation), 9.54.2, 9.58.3\*, 9.106.2. For δεῖ, see 1.91.4\*, 3.45.3, 3.71.3\*, 3.155.6\*, 4.127.2\*, 5.31.4\*, 6.88, 7.49.2\*, 7.147.1, 7.172.2\*, 8.68.2\*, 9.58.2\*. For other cases where χρῆ and δεῖ express one's obligation to do what works best, see n.88.

### The necessity of war

Our discussion will now temporarily shift from the causes to the results of compulsion for the purpose of examining the following issue: if circumstances connected with war may force human action, as in Herodotus' and Thucydides' statements just cited, to what extent does Herodotus represent war itself as dictated by necessity, as in ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν of Thucydides 1.23.6? In a lecture delivered over forty years ago, Arnaldo Momigliano proposed that the reason why ancient historians tend to give unsatisfactory analyses of the profound causes of specific wars is that they are culturally predisposed to view war in general as a permanent and inevitable fact of life. Momigliano included Thucydides in this assessment, in spite of his celebrated distinction between the immediate grievances that led to the Peloponnesian War and its truest cause: 'Thucydides is vague about the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις. He is far superior to Herodotus in explaining the actual conduct of the war with which he is concerned, but he is much less convincing than Herodotus in discovering the remote origins of the war.'<sup>59</sup>

Whether we agree or not with Momigliano's comparative evaluation, it is true that Thucydides clearly states in his own voice that the Peloponnesian War, at least, was inevitable, and the speeches he reports indicate that many of his contemporaries shared this view. Other Thucydidean speakers refer to external or psychological ἀνάγκαι which compel states to expand their rule or go to war against others.<sup>60</sup> These passages reflect the frequency with which ideas of this sort permeated contemporary thought. They were occasionally invoked to justify Athenian imperialism as well as aggressive enterprises designed to check Athenian power. But when we turn to Herodotus, who according to Momigliano attributes greater importance to the specific causes of a war, we notice coincidentally that *he also never says, or allows his characters to say, that initiating a war is the result of ἀνάγκη.*

Is there such a thing, then, as a 'necessary war' for Herodotus? War is an evil but, as we have already seen, fighting is inevitable for people who, against their interests and inclinations, are compelled to do so by a ruler.<sup>61</sup> Aside from this situation, various speakers in Herodotus suggest a distinction between *voluntary* and *necessary* war. Demaratus tells Xerxes that he would not fight with anyone *of his own free will* (ἐκὼν τε εἶναι), but *in case of necessity* (εἰ δὲ ἀναγκαίη εἴη) he most certainly would want to rise to the greatest challenge (7.104.3\*). The Athenians are subject to the 'necessity of evil' in the oracle we have already discussed, and this includes the war that Xerxes has brought.<sup>62</sup> After Salamis, they proclaim that to avenge the destruction of their temples and houses is a *necessity* (ἀναγκαίως ἔχει), so that they cannot come to terms with the invader *even if they should want to do so* (μηδ' ἦν ἐθέλωμεν, 8.144.2\*). All these contexts show that in Herodotus a compulsory war is a defensive war.<sup>63</sup> By contrast, Artabanus entreats Xerxes *not to want* (μὴ βούλευ) to expose himself to any such danger 'when there is *no necessity*' (μηδεμιῆς ἀναγκαίης εὐσύης, 7.10.δ1).<sup>64</sup> In Herodotus' *Histories*, an invasion or a war of aggression is an act of the will and an unnecessary choice.

The only profitable aggressive action that is perpetrated under compulsion of any sort is that of Gyges, who is forced to choose between the murder of Candaules and his own death and chooses the first, thereby rising to power. The other despotic types in the *Histories* all make war

<sup>59</sup> Momigliano (1966) 117-18.

<sup>60</sup> See above, nn.53-4.

<sup>61</sup> See above, p. 36. War as a κακόν (in the narrator's own voice): 8.3.1, 6.98.2.

<sup>62</sup> 7.140.3\* (see above p. 32, interpretations 2 and 3). We recall that the less likely interpretation 1 would make this the only case in the *Histories* where initiating a war resulted from ἀνάγκη.

<sup>63</sup> Thus, the Scythians if it becomes necessary (δέου), will fight when the enemy attacks the graves of their ancestors (4.127.2-3\*). Here the mention of the *graves*

finds a parallel in the utterance of the Athenians to the Spartans at 8.144.2\*, whereas the hypothetical clause is echoed by the words of Demaratus to Xerxes at 7.104. 3\* (εἰ δὲ ἀναγκαίη εἴη). The Scythian defensive *nomos* is a positive paradigm in the *Histories* (cf. 4.46.2-3).

<sup>64</sup> This same expression is applied to Artemisia. Herodotus' evaluation of Artemisia is ambivalent; cf. above p. 37, and below, p. 48. With δεῖ, the need for warfare is put in doubt at 4.80.3\*, 7.9.β2, 8.68.2\* and 7.10.θ1; murder is needless at 3.65.4\*; at 7.144.2, ἐς δέου means 'for the necessity of a defensive war'.

with motives that Thucydides would recognize (imperialism, desire for retaliation, fear, etc.) and for other reasons, but they are never ‘forced’ by any natural or human cause whatsoever – whether by another person, by external circumstances or by psychological factors – to do what they do.<sup>65</sup> Given the availability of ἀνάγκη and other ‘must’ words in contemporary language for talking about human behaviour, and if we consider the seemingly irresistible drive to conquer which Herodotus represents in one after the other of his historical agents, this absence is a meaningful phenomenon. The narrative’s choice of words does not encourage the recipient to think that the ruler, who almost by definition applies compulsion to others, is in his turn truly compelled to do so.

The role which Herodotus attributes, or declines to attribute, to the concept of necessity becomes clearer when we put side by side two passages in which Thucydides and Herodotus say similar things and share a common terminology, but the one uses ἀνάγκη words and the other does not. The subject of discussion is here precisely the causality of wars. In his painstaking analysis of the motives of Croesus’ invasion of Cappadocia, Herodotus starts out by reporting that on account of ‘the hegemony that Cyrus wrested away from Astyages and *the growing power of the Persians* (τὰ τῶν Περσέων πρήγματα αὐξανόμενα)’, Croesus ‘conceived the idea to bring down *the growing power of the Persians* (αὐτῶν αὐξανομένην τὴν δύναμιν), if he could, *before they would become great* (πρὶν μεγάλους γενέσθαι, 1.46.1)’. Later Herodotus gradually adds other psychological and external reasons why Croesus wished to attempt to destroy Persian power: confidence in the apparently favourable oracles (1.71.1, 73.1), ‘desire for more land, wanting to add to his share’ (1.73.1) and, lastly, a wish to avenge the defeat of his brother-in-law Astyages (1.73.1). Terms for wishing and planning abound, but no ἀνάγκη surfaces.

Herodotus’ insistence on the growing power of the Persians give 1.46.1 away as a coded passage: its resemblance to Thucydides’ gloss, that the growing power of Athens (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ... μεγάλους γιγνομένους) and the fear it inspired in the Spartans made war inevitable, is certainly significant.<sup>66</sup> Here and elsewhere the two texts are engaged in a dialogue. Thucydides gives us a panorama of the various arguments that were being made in his time about current issues. Some of these he reports through his speakers while others he expresses directly, having appropriated them as his opinion (see ἡγοῦμαι at 1.23.6). Herodotus, who must have heard the same talk in public speeches, diplomatic exchanges, panhellenic gatherings and informal market-place conversations all over Greece, applies its code to the narrative of earlier events. This is Herodotus’ covert way of showing that historical evidence is relevant to current policies. The contemporary language brings out the similarity of past events, with known outcomes, to recent events whose future outcomes history gives the means to predict.

Herodotus’ accumulation of data for explaining the way in which things generally function would perhaps be of less practical value to his fellow-Greeks if it read into the past the idea that individuals and nations are driven by ἀνάγκη to engage in aggressive or immoral behaviour. People under compulsion, as we have seen, are not entirely in control of their actions. Herodotus, unlike Thucydides, is in the business of investigating responsibility, and his work is a world-changing, other than world-describing, speech act. He praises, blames and accuses, and he informs for the purpose of warning and correcting, not merely the Athenians, but all the Greeks.<sup>67</sup> This perhaps contributes to explaining the way in which Herodotus carefully controls

<sup>65</sup> Similarly, χρῆ and δεῖ are never used in these contexts.

<sup>66</sup> Raaflaub (1987) esp. 243, n.58, suggests that the similarity may constitute a pointer to more recent events and that the whole representation of Croesus by Herodotus (subjects Greeks to tribute, builds empire,

attacks Cyrus out of fear for his growing power, relies on oracles) encapsulates characteristics that recall both Athens and Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>67</sup> Nagy (1990) 228-43 and 250-72 discusses *historie* as juridical inquiry and documents Herodotus’ role as arbitrator. Plutarch’s *De Herodoti malignitate* testifies to

the proliferation of ἀνάγκη words even when he accepts other terms of the contemporary political code that would tend to cluster in the same types of discourse. He excludes them in particular when reporting the motivations of monarchical rulers because these agents are his principal paradigms for incorrect public actions which all leaders and leading states are susceptible to undertaking but should, and *can*, avoid.<sup>68</sup>

### The force of *nomos*

Though Herodotus avoids applying ἀνάγκη terms to the impulse to wage war, the word χρεόν uniquely qualifies such an impulse in the difficult narrative of Xerxes' and Artabanus' dreams, where the mysterious vision denotes the campaign against Greece the king is contemplating as *what is supposed to take place*, τὸ χρεὸν γενέσθαι (7.17.2\*). We have already examined this case in our discussion of supernatural necessity, and the reason for reconsidering it here is that τὸ χρεὸν is likely to include a non-supernatural component and indicate 'what is supposed to happen' according to the predispositions of the parties involved.<sup>69</sup> This is true regardless of the ontological status of the dream, but it becomes especially conspicuous in view of Artabanus' initial suggestion that nightly visions merely replay a man's daytime preoccupations (7.16β2). Through this utterance the text opens the way to a psychological interpretation of the entire episode, which even the unexpected outcome of Xerxes' experiment and Artabanus' own conversion to the idea of a supernatural dream fail to invalidate entirely.

The non-supernatural component of the necessity that compels Xerxes is *nomos*. In the previous narrative of deliberations, Xerxes has demonstrated his concern to carry out the traditional expansionistic policy of his father and earlier Persian kings. In his perception the alternative is either to increase his power or see it diminish, with no possible equilibrium or inactivity in between.<sup>70</sup> This explains why the vision appears to Xerxes when he becomes inclined not to march against Greece, and why it threatens him saying that he will be reduced to insignificance.<sup>71</sup> Artabanus, for his part, has opposed the royal *nomos* of expansion by advising against the expedition. He has also behaved irregularly in the course of the experiment by sitting on the royal throne and impersonating his master, something about which he expresses discomfort (7.16.1). The vision that comes to Artabanus with threats of punishment and branding, therefore, embodies the royal *nomos* from a subordinate's perspective: it reflects his deeply held cultural convictions of what he 'should' do and of his proper station as a slave of the king.<sup>72</sup> Thus, if we accept that τὸ χρεὸν here points to a human cause why an agent 'must' start a war, the cause of the 'must' is the force of *nomos*.

a later ancient reader's awareness of the central role of blame directed against the Greeks in Herodotus. Among the sources mentioned on n.41 above, Fornara (1981) especially emphasizes Herodotus' deliberate silence concerning recent events and his allusive form of discourse. Moles (1996) attributes to Herodotus the goal of 'warning the Athenians'.

<sup>68</sup> Our evidence does not, in other words, support the statements of Fornara (1971) 76-7 that 'the sad recognition of *necessity for war* is the message inherent in [Herodotus'] work', that 'Herodotus considered the events of his own time an unmitigated but *thoroughly unavoidable* disaster', and that according to Herodotus 'with human nature as it is, *acts of injustice were inescapable*' (all italics are mine). Some of these ideas may be perhaps more accurately attributed to Thucydides than to Herodotus.

<sup>69</sup> See above, p. 35.

<sup>70</sup> The connection between the Xerxes' dream and the royal *nomos* of expansion has been argued by Evans (1961). See also Evans (1965) 146.

<sup>71</sup> In the second apparition (7.14\*). Cf. 7.8.α1-2\*, 11.2-3\*, 7.50.3\*. In the first apparition (7.12.2) the vision warns Xerxes against changing his mind since οὔτε ὁ συγγνωστόμενός τοι πάρα, 'there is no one here who will be forgiving'. And when Xerxes announces his change of mind to the Persians he starts out by saying (7.13.2): ἄνδρες Πέρσαι, συγγώμην μοι ἔχετε ὅτι ἀγχίστροφα βουλευόμαι ('Persians, forgive me for going back on my decision'). The verbal correspondence indicates that Xerxes' preoccupation, reflected in the dream, includes the fear of the disapproval of his subjects (cf. 3.134.1-2\*).

<sup>72</sup> 7.17-18. For high officials as royal 'slaves', see e.g. 8.102.3\*. Branding connotes enslavement to the king at 7.233.2.

*Nomos* is indeed the only important category of internal psychological motives that Herodotus denotes with ἀνάγκη words.<sup>73</sup> Of course, the ἀνάγκη *nomoi* exercise does not, as in the case of Xerxes' royal *nomos*, have detrimental results. The difference is due to the fact that the ways in which *kings* go about honouring *nomos*, or the special *nomoi* of kings (including monarchy itself as a *nomos*) have special, negative, status in Herodotus; they often come into conflict with the normal way of things and with a people's traditional *nomoi*.<sup>74</sup> The latter are instruments of order and, if followed, they have a salutary effect.

Ἀνάγκη words are to be found applied to the obligations, prohibitions or penalties imposed by laws, oaths, treaties, kinship or traditional customs.<sup>75</sup> Moral obligation – what we would call one's *duty* – is also grounded in *nomos* and similarly qualified or denoted by these terms. Thus, the ἀνάγκη to fight to which Demaratus refers (7.104.3\*) is imposed by the fact of an invasion, but is also related to moral obligation and to the *nomos despotes* he describes immediately below (7.104.4\*).<sup>76</sup> The word *despotes* attached to *nomos* is designed to recall that despots are by definition agents of compulsion, but at Sparta *nomos* fulfils that role. The ἀναγκαίη that eventually overcomes Prexaspes, who has so far lied to save his life, compels him to reveal the truth.<sup>77</sup> Cured from his *nomos*-destructive madness in a brief moment before his death, Cambyses declares that *it is his absolute obligation* (γίνεται μοι ἀναγκαιότατον) to exhort the Persian nobles to prevent the rule from reverting once more to the Medes (3.65.3\*).

Compulsion produces, as we have already seen, the opposite of a voluntary act.<sup>78</sup> Yet, Spartans and Athenians respond to Xerxes' compulsion to either submit or fight a 'necessary' war by *choosing* to resist.<sup>79</sup> Prexaspes both decides *voluntarily* (ἐκόν) to forget all the falsehoods he had been instructed to say, and at the same time declares himself *obliged* to be truthful (3.75.1-2). Gyges is compelled by a despotic agent either to kill or be killed, and the fact that

<sup>73</sup> Hohti (1975) also almost identifies the divine necessity expressed by the non-oracular χρή and δεῖ in the narrator's glosses anticipating doom (see above, p. 34) with an immanent necessity deriving from the 'nomos king of all' of 3.38.4.

<sup>74</sup> See e.g. 6.62.2 (the Spartan Agetus is compelled by his oath to give his wife to king Ariston), and especially 3.31.4, 7.136.1 and 9.111.1, as well as the paradox of 3.80.3\* with 3.82.5\*.

<sup>75</sup> In Egypt, daughters are obliged to support their parents (2.35.4, *bis*), it is obligatory to bury with special procedures anyone drowned in the river or killed by a crocodile (2.90.1), and to punish with death anyone who kills an ibis or a hawk (2.65.5). When a Spartan king dies, one man and a woman from every household are forced to put on mourning under penalty of a heavy fine (6.58.1) and perioikoi are compelled to attend the funeral (6.58.2). Croesus suggests that Cyrus confiscate the Sardis loot from the Persian soldiers saying that it is necessary a tithe be dedicated to Zeus (1.89.3\*). Notice, however, that at 6.58.1 and 2 the compulsion is quasi-monarchic, and 1.89.3\* describes a disguised case of monarchic compulsion. For oaths see 6.62.2 (above, preceding note). Alyattes and Cyaxares stipulate a marriage alliance in the belief that 'without strong necessity treaties do not last' (1.74.4, though the idea that family ties guarantee peace is undermined by the narrative at 1.75.1). For χρή in reference to what one must do, or what must happen, according to law or custom, propriety

or a rule, see 1.144.2, 1.196.3, 2.35.3, 2.173.2\*, 2.179, 5.111.4\*; for δεῖ, see 1.8.4\*, 1.31.2\* (religious duty), 1.42.2\* (reinforced by ὀφείλω), 1.67.5, 1.199.1, 3.6.2, 3.83.2\* (vote of constitutional committee), 6.58.2 (joined with ἀνάγκη; see above in this note), 7.2.1. For the semantic difference between χρή and δεῖ specifically in relation to *nomos*, see Benardete (1965) 295.

<sup>76</sup> For moral obligation to fight a defensive war, see 7.104.3\* and 8.144.2\* discussed above, p. 44. The ἀναγκαίη to resist against Xerxes that the Greeks attempted to impose on the Thessalians (7.172.3\*) is presumably equivalent to moral pressure. Moral obligation, particularly that of fighting well when on the battlefield, is commonly expressed by χρή: 1.37.2\*, 1.41.3\*, 3.52.4\*, 3.65.5\*, 5.109.2\* and 3\*, 7.13.2\*, 8.79.3\*, 9.16.4\*, 9.17.4\*, 9.45.3\*, 9.53.4, 9.60.2\*, 9.98.3\*; for δεῖ, see 3.69.2\*, 7.172.2\*, 7.168.2, 7.51.2\* (second choice of the Ionians). The normal verb for the legal or moral obligation to repay a debt or a favour is ὀφείλω, 1.42.2\*, 1.138.1, 3.52.1, 6.59, 5.82.1, 5.99.1 (the last two cases of such obligation lead to participation in war).

<sup>77</sup> 3.75.2\*. Truth telling is a Persian *nomos* (1.136.2, 138.1).

<sup>78</sup> Above, p.41. For the lexical opposition of ἀνάγκη and will, see also the expression οὐκ ἐκόντες ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀναγκαιῆς (7.139.3; 9.17.1).

<sup>79</sup> See words indicating the Athenians' choice at 7.139.5 and 7.143.3, and the famous choice of Leonidas to fight at Thermopylae at 7.220.

he has at least this limited choice is singularly emphasized.<sup>80</sup> By opting for the former course of action, he is almost the opposite of Prexaspes, who is forced by Cambyses to kill Smerdis and ends up killing himself as well. The wise Persians compelled to go along with Xerxes *should* warn the man in charge of the impending disaster (χρεόν, 9.16.4\*), but they resign themselves to a necessity of another sort and do not. Compelled to march against Greece, the Ionians *must* (δεῖ) *either* desert and behave as the justest of men *or* be the most unjust by fighting for the king against their fellow-Greeks (7.51.2\*). All these cases indicate that to follow or not the dictates of morality entails an element of choice. They also show how Herodotus' narrative delineates an opposition between the constraint of law, custom or moral obligation on the one hand, and despotic compulsion on the other, so that frequently to accept the one means rejecting the other.<sup>81</sup> Similarly, Solon's fear that he may be *compelled* to abrogate his reforms (1.29.1) illustrates the opposition between personal compulsion (and this time the compelling agent is potentially the Athenian *demos*) and positive law.

Before moving on to the last category, it is appropriate to summarize how our initial questions on Herodotus' use of ἀνάγκη words can be answered on the basis of the cumulative evidence presented so far. The lower frequency of ἀνάγκη terms in Herodotus in comparison to Thucydides has something to do with Herodotus' moralistic outlook on causation. With regard to Herodotus' determinism, or lack of it, the most ambiguous area is one which has no equivalent in Thucydides: divine necessity. Here ἀνάγκη terms express mostly the god-willed necessity of the negative consequences of immoral actions. Other terms of necessity in communications from gods to men, the utterances of various speakers, and the interpretive glosses of the narrator himself generally conform to the same pattern, though there are some cases – appropriately enough when gods are in view – where ambiguity prevails.

When ἀνάγκη terms, with the subsidiary χρή/δεῖ, are applied to natural causes, the comparison with Thucydides becomes more meaningful. Whether the narrator or the characters are speaking, the text of Thucydides is prodigal, and that of Herodotus is sparing of terms that may possibly suggest that people have no choice but to take certain actions (especially unjust actions) in the face of laws of nature, external circumstances, issues of basic survival, and psychological factors. Even those on the receiving end of monarchic compulsion are, in an absolute sense, free to avoid, disregard or resist it. Some of them choose to do so, sometimes at the risk of their lives, and sometimes by answering to the higher compulsion of moral obligation and *nomos*.

This view of 'necessity' reveals Herodotus' unwillingness to represent certain political events, such as war, empire and the aggressions that accompany the growth of states, as inevitable natural phenomena the way Thucydides appears to do. It confirms Herodotus' tendency to evaluate actions from an ethical perspective and his self-imposed task not just to report, but to praise and to blame, and to treat his research of *aitiai*, causes, as a juridical inquiry into who is *aitios*. Herodotus' use of the stem ἀναγκ- (and χρή/δεῖ) is also consistent with the high value the *Histories* elsewhere attribute to the social order established through *nomos* on the one hand and collective or individual political freedom on the other. The last category of Herodotean passages where we find ἀνάγκη words belongs, as we have mentioned at the beginning of this paper, to a different level of discourse, that at which the narrator talks about his act of narrating. It represents, however, a related phenomenon, and an index of the narrator's personal involvement in the principles which the preceding analysis has revealed.

<sup>80</sup> Gyges says that he is being compelled to kill Candaules (1.11.4\*), but the queen and the narrator both apply ἀναγκ- (1.11.3) and δεῖ (1.11.2\*, 1.12.1) to the choice he 'wants' to make (αἴρῃσιν, ὀκότερην βούλεται τραπέσθαι, 1.11.2\*; διακρίναι τοιαύτην αἴρῃσιν;

αἰρέεται αὐτὸς περιεῖναι, 1.11.4). Gyges also forgoes moral obligation when he agrees to violate one of the old principles 'from which one *must* (δεῖ) learn' (1.8.4\*) and sees what he *should not* have (μή...δεῖ, 1.11.2\*).

<sup>81</sup> Cf. above, p. 44 with n.74.



### The compulsion of the *logos*

In Herodotus ἀνάγκη- stems occur five times in the passive voice within metanarrative statements, applied to the narrator himself. In all these cases ἀνάγκη is a compulsion ‘to say’ something, and its cause is something akin to *nomos*: the rules that apply to the narrator in the fulfilment of his task.

- (1) I will mention ‘divine things’ only when *absolutely compelled* (ἐξαναγκαζόμενος) by the *logos* (2.3.2).
- (2) The things I have touched upon concerning divine matters, I have said *seized by necessity* (ἀναγκαίη καταλαμβάνόμενος, 2.65.2).
- (3) I make no mention of the local leaders in Xerxes’ army because I am not *constrained by necessity* (οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαίη ἐξέργομαι, 7.96.1).
- (4) I make no mention of the other taxiarchs in Xerxes’ fleet on the grounds that I am *not compelled* (ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενος, 7.99.1).
- (5) At this point I am *held by necessity* (ἀναγκαίη ἐξέργομαι) to display an opinion odious to most men, but nevertheless since it seems to me to be true, I will not hold back (7.139.1).

Self-referential ἀνάγκη- as in the statements just quoted is entirely absent in Thucydides, though it can be found within intradiegetic utterances in *oratio recta* both in Herodotus and Thucydides. In a speech in which the Athenians at Sparta defend their right to the empire, they say that at the cost of causing annoyance, *it is necessary* for them to remind the listeners of the role the Athenians in the Persian Wars (Thuc. 1.73.2\*). This is a case of what we may call ‘rhetorical *ananke*’, when the speaker claims that the present occasion, or an argument that others have just put forth (as here the Corinthians), makes it imperative for the sake of the effectiveness of his speech that he cover certain topics. In a Herodotean speech which bears many resemblances to the one just cited in Thucydides, the Athenians at Plataea state that, since the Tegeans have been recounting their past deeds, *it is necessary* (ἀναγκαίως ἔχει) that the Athenians also demonstrate on what grounds they are entitled to occupy the right wing of the army.<sup>82</sup>

In cases when saying certain things is the right and fair thing to do, and perhaps entails certain risks for the speaker, ‘rhetorical’ ἀνάγκη is identical with the moral obligation to speak out. Thus at the point when Artabanus says that ‘since there are many issues at stake, it is necessary to prolong the discussion’, he is mainly concerned that his strategic advice to Xerxes be effective by covering all the bases (7.51.1\*). The exhortation of Cambyses on his death-bed, however, and the revelation made by Prexaspes before he hurls himself from the tower are rendered compulsory by a sense of duty toward their audiences.<sup>83</sup> In the case of Demaratus, as long as Xerxes compels him to speak at all (monarchic compulsion), he evidently feels compelled to speak the truth (moral obligation).<sup>84</sup>

It is in this context that we should consider the five Herodotean programmatic statements quoted above. The first two refer to the same obligation to discuss divine matters in the Egyptian ethnography. This obligation is ‘rhetorical’ – exercised by the *logos* (2.3.2) – but worded in terms that suggest that it is an unwelcome duty and that the desire to make the opposite choice is exceptionally strong.<sup>85</sup> This sort of material is to some extent repulsive to the narrator him-

<sup>82</sup> 9.27.1\*. This speech is designed anachronistically to illustrate themes of fifth-century hegemonic oratory; hence its resemblance to Thucydides’ Athenian speech at the Spartan congress, which in turn reports *ta deonta*, i.e. typically incorporates those themes (above, n.2). See Loraux (1986) 74-5 and 89; Raaflaub (1987) 239.

<sup>83</sup> 3.65.6\*, 75.2. See above, p. 44.

<sup>84</sup> 7.101.3\*, 7.104.1\*, 7.104.5\*. Cf. Croesus compelled to speak by Cyrus (1.86.4). See Hohti (1974).

<sup>85</sup> The compound ἐξαναγκάζειν occurs only at 2.3.2. On the opposite side we have in each case an expression of ‘not wanting’: ‘I am not eager (πρόθυμος) to recount in detail’ (2.3.2), ‘I very much avoid (φεύγω μάλιστα) explaining’ (2.65.2). At 2.46.2, the narrator says that ‘it is not too pleasant (οὐ...ἡδίων) for me to tell’, and at 2.47.2 that a certain myth is ‘not decent enough’ (οὐκ εὐπρεπέστερος) for him to report. In another, and perhaps different, set of cases, the narrator’s silence on reli-

self.<sup>86</sup> By including it he risks exposing a foreign religion as shocking or absurd to the very audience to whom he wants to demonstrate, among other things, that ‘men’s knowledge about the divine is equivalent all over the world’.<sup>87</sup> Universal respect for *nomos* competes with the *logos*, and the second compels the narrator to explain Egyptian piety, cult and culture to the farthest limits that are set by the former. This is what we may call the *nomos* of the *logos*.<sup>88</sup> But the *logos* is Herodotus’ own, and the compulsion it exercises represents both an obligation and a free choice.<sup>89</sup>

The requirements of Herodotus’ ‘story’, which must be complete and exact and also provide useful information, are presumably the point of statements 3 and 4, which have similar referents. Here, however, passive ἀναγκ- appears in the negative, and the narrator’s shrug with respect to what he is *not* obliged to do suggests a polarity with the surrounding context. At 7.96.1, the narrator is free, whereas the agents of his immediate narrative are slaves:

I make no mention of the local leaders in Xerxes’ army because I am not *held by necessity* (οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαίη ἐξέργουμαι) for the sake of *the narrative that derives from my research* (ἐξ ἱστορίας λόγον). For the leaders of each ethnic group were not noteworthy, and moreover within each ethnic contingent there were as many leaders as there were cities represented. They followed not as commanders, but only as slaves, like the others who were subject to command in this expedition...

Herodotus’ *historie* may well have uncovered the leaders’ names, but their subjection to monarchical rule makes them in some sense ‘not worthy’ of the *logos* of Herodotus, who in turn is subject to no one, only bound to the obligations entailed by the *logos* itself.<sup>90</sup> Similarly, the

gious matters is motivated by the fact that speaking openly of such things is ‘not holy’ (see especially 2.61.1, 2.86.2). All of Herodotus’ avowals of silence in Book 2 are cited by Linforth (1924), esp. 280, and (1928) 240. For all expressions of reticence in Herodotus, see Lateiner (1989) 73-5.

<sup>86</sup> The theriomorphic aspects of Egyptian religion were repulsive to the Greeks: Lloyd (1976) 293-4.

<sup>87</sup> 2.3.2. For the scholarly controversy over this passage and relative bibliography, see Lloyd (1976) *ad loc.* Linforth (1924), esp. 276-80, and (1928) 201-7.

<sup>88</sup> The requirement of the *logos*, here signified by an ἀναγκ- stem, is also expressed in Herodotus’ metanarrative with the verb δίζημαι, ‘seek out’: ‘from the beginning has my *logos* been seeking out these additions’ (4.30.1); and ἐπιδίζημαι: ‘at this point my *logos* seeks out who is Cyrus...’ (1.95.1). See also ἐμοί... ὑπόκειται: ‘it is incumbent upon me in my entire *logos* that I write what I hear is being said by each source’ (2.123.1); and ὀφείλω, twice at 7.152.3: ‘I ought to say what is being said, but I am not obliged to believe it’. See Dewald (1987) on these and other first person interventions by the narrator; also Fowler (1996), esp. 69, 76. References to the requirements of the *logos* are comparable to what we may call the ‘*must* of proper procedure’ with χρῆ and δεῖ, a category which, like rhetorical necessity, is akin to that of strategy: what we must do in order to be successful at whatever our current project is. The verb δεῖ appears frequently in programmatic statements that proclaim the need to include evidence or to pursue certain topics, but it bears less emphasis than ἀναγκ- and the other terms we have mentioned (see e.g. 1.179.1: ‘And yes, I must still explain, in addition to those other things, where the dirt from the ditch was utilized and in which way the wall

was built’). It suggests (Dewald (1987) 165), ‘a sense of strain inherent in the problem of composition’. Cf. e.g. 5.54.1, 5.62.1, 5.67.3. Statements on how we *should* evaluate sources or available evidence, with δεῖ or χρῆ/χρεόν occur at 1.57.1 and 2 (‘if one must deduce what language the Pelasgians spoke from the existing Pelasgians’), 2.120.3 (‘if it is necessary to believe these epic poets...’); 7.214.2 (‘we should base our judgement on the fact that the pylagoroi put a price not on the head of Onetes or Corydallos, but on that of Ephialtes’); on whether the narrator has the right to draw certain conclusions at 9.65.2 (‘if it is necessary to have an opinion about divine matters...’). In the narrative, characters theorize on the right way to acquire information (‘it would have been necessary for Croesus to inquire further whose empire the oracle meant’, 1.91.4\*), make evaluations (‘it is necessary to look at the end of everything’, 1.32.9\*), assess historical precedent (‘if we must judge from the things that were done by those Greeks who burned Sardis and marched against Asia’, 7.11.2\*), and comment on the appropriateness of making certain arguments (‘we know that the Persian power is much greater than ours, so there is no need for you to throw this in our face’, 8.143.1\*). See the discussion of so-called procedural χρῆ in other authors by Benardete 1965 (289), and cf. Craik (1998) 18 on χρῆ and δεῖ in Hippocratic prescriptions.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. the voluntary aspect of moral obligation, above, pp.44-5.

<sup>90</sup> If we accept the conjectural reading οὔτε... ἐπάξιον (‘not...noteworthy’), the adjective may imply a moral judgement of these monarchic slaves (‘not...worthy’); it occurs only one other time, positively referred to νόμιμα (2.79.1).

other statement (7.99.1) creates a word-play between two ἀναγκ- stems in the passive negative, one referring to the narrator and one to an agent:<sup>91</sup>

I make no mention of the other taxiarchs in Xerxes' fleet on the grounds that *I am not compelled* (ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενος), except for Artemisia, whom I consider a great wonder, a woman marching against Greece, who held the rule after the death of her husband and, though she had a young son, made the expedition out of sheer courage and manliness, *there being no compulsion upon her* to do so (οὐδεμιῆς οἱ εἰσῆς ἀναγκαίης).

In simplified terms, the combination of 7.96.1 with 7.99.1, which follow each other at close range, yields the sequence: I am not compelled to mention other commanders who were slaves (i.e. under compulsion), but [I am compelled to/will mention] Artemisia whom I consider a *thoma* and who was not under compulsion. Antithetical to those other foreign subjects of Xerxes, the free narrator (the prominent ἐγὼ of 7.96.1) is analogous to Artemisia, insofar as both of them are immune from external compulsion.<sup>92</sup>

The last of the metanarrative statements where the narrator applies ἀναγκ- to himself throws some light on this insistent parallel between Herodotus and his characters in relation to issues of constraint. Here the obligation dictated by the *logos* does not so much create a theoretical opposition between the autonomous Greek *histor* and the foreign subjects of a king, as it counters something analogous to monarchic constraint: a real and immediate political intimidation that comes from within Greece and outside the text (7.139.1).

At this point I am *compelled by necessity* publicly to display an opinion that most people will resent, but still, since it appears to me to be something true, I shall not hold back (ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίη ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι ἐπίφθονον πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων· ὅμως δέ, τῆι γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐπισχίσω).

This statement emphatically announces an interpretive gloss which, in a fugue of contrary-to-fact past conditions, sketches the scenario of what would have been the case, had the Athenians chosen not to oppose Xerxes on the sea.<sup>93</sup> The Peloponnesian allies would have surrendered, *not of their own free will, but out of compulsion* (οὐκ ἐκόντων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀναγκαίης); the Spartans alone would have resisted, perhaps, but they would all have died after performing great deeds (ἀποδεξάμενοι ἔργα μεγάλα, 7.139.3). As for the wall across the Isthmus, even many layers of walls (139.3), 'I cannot figure out' what use that would have been.

As the narrator provides an assessment of who played what role in 480, he does so in terms so defensive and personal that the topic suddenly emerges as a current and controversial concern. The opinion that the Athenians were then the saviours of Greece (139.5) is the narrator's own almost heroic performance (see γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι at 139.1). Again, implicitly contrasted with monarchic compulsion, the ἀναγκαίη of Herodotus' *logos* must this time override φθόνος, the resentment of the public, which will target the researcher/narrator displaying an opinion

<sup>91</sup> The significance of such verbal correspondences between the narrator and the referents of the *Histories* has been noticed, for example, in the case ἀπόδειξις/ἀποδείκνυμαι, the first applied in the first sentence to Herodotus' *historie* and the second to the achievements he is going to recount (ἔργα...ἀποδεχθέντα). In the rest of the *Histories*, ἀποδείκνυμαι recurs with the meaning of performing deeds and displaying opinions, both in narrative and metanarrative in the latter sense, as we shall see below in the case of 7.139.1. Erbse (1956) 209-11. Nagy (1990) 220-1.

<sup>92</sup> Artemisia is a paradox: at a different level she is herself, of course, a τύραννος who wages war 'without compulsion/necessity', as monarchs are wont to do (see above, n.63). Munson (1988). The self-referential aspect of some of Herodotus' characters has been taken for granted in some cases (e.g. Solon), and more subtly explored in others; see, for example, Benardete (1969) 14-16 on Arion and especially Christ (1994) on king-researchers.

<sup>93</sup> 7.139.1-5. See Demand (1987) for the rhetorical aspect of this passage.

ἐπίφθορος to most men. The reason for the compulsion is here expressed in ethical terms. It is the narrator's moral duty to keep the record straight, not to yield to the temptation of revising history, but preserve what seems to him according to evidence (μοι φαίνεται) the truthful account of the past (ἀληθές, cf. τάληθέος at 139.5), regardless of the distasteful uses to which it is now being put.<sup>94</sup>

Through the metanarrative use of the stem ἀναγκ-, the narrator of the *Histories* clearly represents himself as analogous to the most admirable of his characters on the receiving end of compulsion. He is, like Artemisia, a free agent, and the opposite of an imperial subject, able to disregard political pressure, or face it and fight it, no matter what side it may come from. Like Prexaspes and Demaratus, he is compelled by *nomos despotes*, which in his case means the rules that apply to him as researcher, recorder, adviser to his audience, corrector of their prejudices, and arbitrator of their differences. Herodotus' obligations include adequate instruction of his audience, relevancy, fairness and a non-partisan respect for truth.

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<sup>94</sup> On the basis of other evidence in the *Histories* we cannot agree with Evans (1969) that, just because Herodotus is here verifying a version of events that had become in his time a 'propaganda weapon' (cf. Thuc. 1.73-75\*), he is also expressing sympathy with the aims of the propaganda. τῆι γέ μοι bespeaks reluctance (the

same sort of unwillingness to say something offensive is evidenced by the incidental programmatic gloss at 8.73.3). The vocabulary of 'truth' is here conjoined with that of opinion, yet this is Herodotus' most unambiguous declaration of truth in terms of *aletheie* ever. See Darbo-Peschanski (1987) 164-89, and esp. 165-7.

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